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The Elections in Uganda, February 2016 
Ryan Gibb 
Abstract: On 18 February, Uganda conducted presidential and parliamen-
tary elections. Incumbent president Yoweri Museveni of the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) won the multiparty contest for a third con-
secutive time. If his reign as the NRM leader during Uganda’s stint as a 
one-party state is counted, the February elections marked the beginning of 
Museveni’s fifth overall term as president. The NRM continues to domi-
nate parliament, having won a super-majority of the contested seats. Op-
position members who competed for both the presidential seat and a seat 
in parliament contested the results of the election, and the primary oppo-
sition candidate Kizza Besigye was placed under house arrest. International 
observers questioned the integrity of the results, specifically in rural areas 
that were poorly monitored, and opposition strongholds in urban centres 
suffered logistical problems. The elections reconfirmed the strength of the 
NRM following years of political infighting. 
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Uganda held elections for president, the national assembly, and local 
councils on 18 February 2016. This election was Uganda’s third since a 
multiparty system was reintroduced in 2004, and the third since Uganda 
relaxed the term limits on the presidency. The National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) continued to dominate, and as in previous elections, 
opposition candidates faced arrest, informal harassment, and a lopsided 
political arena.  
Presidential politics in Uganda are a national drama. While the NRM 
has struggled with internal rifts since 2011, the party has continued to 
dominate at every level of government. The most competitive presiden-
tial contenders in this election were incumbent Yoweri Museveni of the 
NRM, Kizza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), and 
Amama Mbabazi of the newly formed Go Forward Party, which repre-
sents a combined effort to be more influential on the part of the Demo-
cratic Party, the Uganda People’s Congress, and the Justice Forum. 
Besigye sought the presidency in three previous elections without suc-
cess, though the FDC remains the best-organised opposition to the 
NRM. Mbabazi, on the other hand, presented an interesting challenge to 
Museveni, since he is a former NRM prime minister and drew support 
from the NRM party base. Museveni reportedly spent 27 billion Ugan-
dan shillings or roughly USD 7 million, which was about 12 times the 
combined amount spent by his two closest challengers. According to a 
report in The Daily Monitor (Kafeero 2016), the NRM party accounted for 
roughly 87.9 per cent of the total spending in the nation on campaigns.  
The campaigns began on 9 November 2015 and lasted until 48 hours 
before the polls opened on 18 February 2016. On 15 January, Uganda 
held its first-ever presidential debate, which was organised by the Inter-
Religious Council of Uganda and the Elders Forum Uganda. Seven can-
didates participated, though incumbent president Museveni decided not 
to attend. A second debate on 13 February included all of the candidates. 
For the first time, the Electoral Commission (EC) of Uganda used a 
Biometric Voter Verification System to better verify voters’ identity. The 
EC also distributed voter location slips to inform voters about the loca-
tion of their polling stations, where voters presented their slips as identi-
fication. Nevertheless, the elections were once again plagued by logistical 
problems and external observers were highly critical. The chief observer 
of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) noted 
the polarised discourse and the atmosphere of intimidation that had 
preceded the election, as well as the fact that 85 per cent of tally centres 
did not print sub-county results by polling station and thus did not com-
ply with a protocol for total transparency (DEMGROUP 2016: 3).  
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Ahead of the elections, the government recruited “crime preventers,” 
ostensibly to protect villages during the elections. These extra-constitu-
tional constables, however, were criticised in a joint statement by Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Network Uganda, 
Chapter Four Uganda, and the Human Rights Initiative. According to the 
statement, the crime preventers “acted in partisan ways and have carried 
out brutal assaults and extortion with no accountability” (HRW 2016). 
According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch’s reports, 
some crime preventers were instructed to harass opposition supporters 
(HRW 2016). The EU EOM estimated that there were as many as 2.5 mil-
lion crime preventers across the country (DEMGROUP 2016: 16). The 
recruiting and training of these “crime preventers” may have also func-
tioned as a campaign recruitment mechanism and distributional tool.  
Anticipating violence, the NRM government again blocked the social 
media network Twitter and SMS services. According to Godfrey Mutabazi, 
the executive director of the Uganda Communications Commission, social 
media were disabled because security agents were concerned that the pub-
lic would use these to incite violence. This concern was not unfounded: 
following the 2011 election, Kizza Besigye had warned that Uganda would 
experience an uprising similar to that of the Arab Spring. Following the 
2016 election, the EU Observer Mission, US secretary of state John Kerry, 
former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, and US ambassador Debo-
rah Malac expressed serious concerns regarding the social media shut-
down, the detention of opposition figures, and the harassment of media 
members. On 9 July 2015, Go Forward’s Amama Mbabazi and FDC’s 
Kizza Besigye had been placed under “preventative arrest.” Following the 
elections, Besigye was also placed under “house arrest,” ostensibly to pre-
vent him from organising protests as he had done in 2011. As of 31 May 
2016 he has been standing trial for treason. 
Results
As in previous elections, Ugandans overwhelmingly elected the NRM to 
parliamentary positions and incumbent president Museveni to a fifth 
five-year term. However, the 18 February elections were plagued by 
logistical problems. The EC failed to deliver ballots to several polling 
stations around the country, and frustrated voters waited in queues. 
Voting materials were delayed in Mbale district, Muzimya municipality, 
Wakiso district, and parts of Kampala. The EC recognised these prob-
lems and apologised via Twitter.  
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Table 1. Presidential Election Results 
Candidate Party Votes Vote share 
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni NRM 5,971,872 60.62%
Kizza Besigye Kifefe FDC 3,508,687 35.61%
Amama Mbabazi Independent 136,519 1.39%
Abed Bwanika PDP 89,005 0.90%
Baryamureeba Benansius Independent 52,798 0.54%
Maureen Faith Kyalya Waluube Independent 42,833 0.43%
Benon Buta Biraaro FPU 25,600 0.26%
Mabirizi Joseph Independent 24,498 0.25%
      
Registered voters 15,277,198    
Valid votes 9,851,812    
Invalid and spoilt votes 506,324    
Turnout 67.61%     
Source: Uganda Electoral Commission 2016.
Historical trends show that Museveni’s support comes from rural areas, 
whereas opposition candidates’ support originates from specific regions 
and/or urban centres. The NRM’s campaign united the policy platforms 
of its parliamentary and presidential candidates, while the other parties re-
mained fragmented in cities and specific geographic regions. Of Uganda’s 
112 districts, only 14 chose Kizza Besigye over President Museveni. 
Besigye’s strongholds included Soroti, Pader, Tororo, Mbale, Sironko, Lira, 
Gulu, Amuru, Ngora, Masaka, Kampala, and Wakiso (Kiggundu 2016). 
This was an increase of 10 districts over Besigye’s last attempt in 2011, and 
a net increase of over 1.2 million votes compared to Museveni’s increase 
of 189,134 votes. The overall trend in the last 10 years of presidential elec-
tions indicates a more competitive election, albeit one still dominated by 
the NRM.  
Women candidates can run in general elections, but there are also 
seats reserved for women candidates in parliament. At the national level, 
women are increasingly competing for open parliamentary seats, with an 
increase from 23 women candidates (vs. 609 men) to 83 (vs. 1,223 men) 
– or from approximately 3.7 per cent to 6.8 per cent – in 2011 and 2016 
respectively. Women’s advocacy groups note that many of the same 
practices that ensure NRM candidate success – incumbency advantages, 
clientelist support, and fear – negatively affect women’s success in the 
general election (Tripp 2006). According to the African Centre for Media 
Excellence (2015), women candidates receive less news coverage than 
their male counterparts. Women lack the funds to compete in the most 
contentious political arenas and lack the mobilisation networks that men 
have through their privileged social and economic status. Women’s par-
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liamentary success frequently depends on their compliance with the NRM 
regime’s party platforms (Goetz 2002; Women’s Democracy Group 2016), 
and this undermines their capacity and propensity to advocate for po-
sitions that might benefit women at the expense of official NRM policy.  
Table 2. Parliamentary Election Results 
Party Elected 
MPs 
Reserved 
women’s 
seats
Special 
seats 
Total 
seats 
National Resistence 
Movement 
199 84 10 293 
Forum for Democratic 
Change 
29 7 0 36 
Democratic Party 13 2 0 15 
Uganda People’s Congress 4 2 0 6 
Independents 44 17 5 66 
Uganda People’s Defense 
Force 
0 0 10 10 
Source: Uganda Electoral Commission 2016.
The NRM won 199 of the 289 seats in the general parliamentary election 
and 84 of the 112 seats reserved for women. As in previous elections, the 
NRM soundly defeated all the other parties, and the independent candi-
dates won more seats than any of the other parties’ candidates in the 
parliamentary elections. Independent candidates have won more parlia-
mentary seats than registered parties’ candidates, aside from NRM can-
didates, since 2006.  
Local government elections followed the presidential and parlia-
mentary elections by one week, occurring the following Wednesday. 
Each of Uganda’s 112 districts held elections for chairpersons and local 
councillors. According to Uganda’s constitution, the five-tier local coun-
cil structure elects a new leadership every five years, directly following 
the national elections. At the highest level of local governance, NRM 
candidates won 82 of 112 district chairperson seats, while independent 
candidates won 17 seats and FDC candidates and the Uganda Peoples’ 
Congress each won four. The FDC won the urban districts of Gulu and 
Ngora, while Erias Lukwago, the Democratic Party candidate, retained 
his office as Lord Mayor of Kampala.  
Election Post Mortem 
The NRM possesses three complementary, insurmountable advantages 
in every election. The first advantage is incumbency. NRM candidates 
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already have voter recognition and the use of state resources to operate 
their offices. Incumbents receive more coverage through state television, 
state-controlled radio stations, public venues, and state offices by virtue 
of their status as elected officials. Through incumbency advantages and 
political appointments the NRM is able to reward loyal party members 
(voters and officeholders) with government services in their communi-
ties. Building on the historical advantage that the NRM government 
enjoyed during the period when Uganda’s constitution established a “no 
party” democracy, the NRM boasts outreach programmes, call centres, 
and a national grass-roots mobilisation network that is unparalleled in 
Uganda. Though it is illegal to use government resources for campaign 
purposes as stipulated under Section 27 of the Presidential Elections Act 
(2005) and Section 25 of the Parliamentary Elections Act (2005), the 
NRM government blurs the distinction between campaigning and civic 
education. The NRM’s legal incumbency-related advantage in terms of 
recruitment, organisational structure, and national presence ensures the 
party’s success as long as the current president remains head of the party.  
The second advantage is the NRM’s capacity to offer credible 
promises to Ugandans. Among other things, the NRM government has 
dramatically expanded primary and secondary school services (Stasavage 
2005), has built and rebuilt roads to every major city, has secured peace, 
and has expanded local service provision through local councils and 
through the exponential multiplication of districts (Green 2010). Much 
of this service provision is clientelistic, and most Ugandans have enjoyed 
a much-improved quality of life under the NRM regime. Scholarly re-
search into Ugandan politics contends that many Ugandans are unable to 
decouple the NRM from the government, believing that the government 
of Uganda is the NRM and the NRM is the government of Uganda 
(Bratton and Lambright 2001; Asiimwe 2010).  
Popular fear of political upheaval is the final advantage that the 
NRM government enjoys. Ugandans old enough to remember the vio-
lence of the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s can recall the chaos of po-
litical violence. Those from the countryside, especially in the Luwero 
triangle, remember the anarchy of these decades, and this fear contrib-
utes to their support for the current president and his regime. Museveni 
has stoked this fear with cryptic remarks, such as his statement that 
“Elections are no joke. It is a matter of life and death. If you 
decide wrongly, you will bear the consequences. It has happened 
in the past. It can happen again.” (Wax 2006)  
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Uganda’s security apparatus reinforces these claims by routinely impris-
oning political opponents (e.g. Kizza Besigye, Charles Peter Mayiga, and 
Betty Nambooze) and by militarising urban areas during political events.  
Scepticism remains regarding the results of the most recent election. 
Mbabazi filed a petition to the Supreme Court, but runner-up Besigye 
did not. The FDC candidate was under house arrest and had lost confi-
dence in the courts. Independent polls predicted an NRM victory (Re-
search World International 2015), and the Supreme Court affirmed the 
legitimacy of the election. US secretary of state Kerry and the US Em-
bassy to Uganda, as well as other international observers, questioned the 
integrity of the election results and criticised the NRM’s crackdown on 
human rights and civil liberties (DEMGROUP 2016).  
Yoweri Katunga Museveni was inaugurated for the fifth time on 
12 May 2016 and thus continues to be the only person to have served as 
Uganda’s president since the country promulgated its current constitution 
in 1995. President Museveni’s NRM party continues to dominate in par-
liament and is extending its tenure as the only nationally organised party. 
The long-term political future of Uganda is much less certain. President 
Museveni turns 72 in August 2016, which will make him one of Africa’s 
oldest presidents by the time his term ends. Ugandan political commenta-
tors suggest that Brigadier General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Museveni’s 
oldest son and the commander of Uganda’s special forces, will assume the 
leadership of whatever the cadre of political and economic elite call them-
selves after Museveni is no longer president (Gyezaho 2012; Sserunjogi 
2014). Additionally, the long-term prospects for democracy in Uganda 
appear less than positive because of the NRM government’s continuing 
discrimination against opposition groups, including the current (at the time 
of writing) trial of the only viable presidential opposition candidate, Kizza 
Besigye.  
The elections may have reaffirmed the strength of Museveni’s control 
within the NRM, but younger party members continue to struggle against 
the status quo. Without legitimate democratic contests, Uganda’s entire 
constitution may be controversial when Museveni no longer leads the 
NRM. The 2016 elections more closely resembled the 2006 elections than 
the 2011 elections, in terms of both results and electoral violence. Unlike 
the case of the 2006 elections, opposition candidates unified before and 
after the 2011 elections, staging a “Walk to Work” protest. The Inter-Party 
Cooperation (IPC) coalition of party candidates challenged the govern-
ment’s legitimacy following the 2011 presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions, and a similar coalition of parties, the Democratic Alliance (TDA), 
challenged the legitimacy of the government following the 2016 elections.  
 100 Ryan Gibb 
As was the case in previous elections, the 2016 elections demon-
strated the NRM party’s dominance of national and local elections. The 
NRM has maintained its control of formal and informal institutions in 
the country despite the multiparty elections, periodic Supreme Court 
challenges, and infighting that threatens to splinter the party. While the 
party’s dominance will likely continue for the time being, the question 
remains as to how the country will function when President Museveni 
can no longer rule.  
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Die Wahlen in Uganda im Februar 2016 
Zusammenfassung: Am 18. Februar 2016 wurden in Uganda Präsident-
schafts- und Parlamentswahlen abgehalten. Der Amtsinhaber, Präsident 
Yoweri Museveni von der National Resistance Movement (NRM), konnte 
den Parteienwettbewerb zum dritten Mal nacheinander für sich entschei-
den. Bezieht man die Zeit ein, in der er als Führer der NRM über den 
damaligen Einparteienstaat Uganda herrschte, markieren die Februarwah-
len den Beginn der fünften Präsidentschaftsperiode Musevenis. Die NRM 
hat auch die große Mehrheit der Parlamentssitze gewonnen und dominiert 
damit weiterhin das Parlament. Mitglieder der Opposition, die für die Prä-
sidentschaft oder einen Sitz im Parlament kandidiert hatten, stellten die 
Wahlergebnisse infrage. Der wichtigste Kandidat der Opposition, Kizza 
Besigye, wurde unter Hausarrest gestellt. Auch internationale Beobachter 
bezweifelten die Integrität der Ergebnisse, insbesondere in ländlichen Re-
gionen, wo das Wahlgeschehen nur unzureichend beobachtet werden 
konnte; in Hochburgen der Opposition in städtischen Zentren hatte es 
zudem logistische Probleme gegeben. Nach Jahren interner Machtkämpfe 
wurde die Stärke der NRM erneut bestätigt. 
Schlagwörter: Uganda, Politisches System, Wahl/Abstimmung, Wahl-
kampf, Wahlergebnis/Abstimmungsergebnis 
 
